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New Alaska Law Will Enhance Nationwide Estate
Planning-Part 1
This first installment of a two-part article analyzes how recent Alaska legislation
expands opportunities for transfers of IRAs to trusts, asset protection, and decanting.
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Alaska has been one of the most progressive states in revising and clarifying its laws to permit more
efficient estate planning. For example, Alaska was the first state to adopt domestic asset protection trust
(DAPT) legislation. (A DAPT is an irrevocable trust with an independent trustee who has absolute
discretion to make distributions to a class of beneficiaries that includes the settlor.) Among other things,
this permits an individual to create a self-settled trust in Alaska in a manner so it should not be included in
his or her gross estate at death. 1 Now more than a dozen other states have adopted one or more

variations of the Alaska law. 2
Alaska also was the first state, in modern times, to adopt an "opt in" community property system that may
even be used by non-Alaskans who create an Alaska Community Property Trust, which allows both
spouses' halves of the community property to receive an adjustment in basis when the first spouse dies. 3
Alaska was the leader in providing that a charging order is the sole remedy for creditors seeking to collect
from a limited partner's interest in a limited partnership or a member's interest in a limited liability
company. 4 Alaska is the sole state that provides that a court may decree dissolution of a limited
partnership or a limited liability company only if the court determines that it is "impossible" to carry on the
business. 5 Alaska was the second state (following New York) to adopt a "decanting" statute, which now
has been enacted in various forms in approximately 20 states. 6 Alaska is one of three states permitting
pre-mortem probate of a will (that is, of a living person) that can thwart a post-death will contest. 7
Further, because Alaska permits the will of a non-domiciliary of the state to direct original probate there,
this pre-mortem probate system can be and has been used by non-Alaskans to avoid post-mortem will
contests. 8
In numerous years since 1997, Alaska has adopted legislation to continue to help estate planners provide
better planning options for their clients. This year is no exception. Alaska's Legislature has enacted new
legislation aimed at continuing the trend. 9 This article will discuss these changes and point out how they
can be used to achieve enhanced planning opportunities.

Lifetime transfers of IRAs to trusts
It is nearly axiomatic that lifetime transfers, whether direct gifts to loved ones or to irrevocable trusts for
their benefit, funding of grantor retained annuity trusts (GRATs), installment sales to grantor trusts, loans
of cash or otherwise, are more efficient estate tax planning arrangements than are transfers occurring at
death. Many individuals hold interests in individual retirement accounts (IRAs) or other tax-exempt
retirement plans almost all of which can be rolled over (that is, transferred) to another IRA. 10 Moreover,
interests in such plans or accounts often represent a very significant, sometimes a majority, portion of a
taxpayer's wealth.
Lifetime estate planning for IRAs or other tax-exempt retirement plans is difficult compared to many other
assets, not just because the IRA and plan rules are extremely complicated but on account of limitations
on the transfer of interests in qualified plans and IRAs and the fact that the transfer may trigger all of the
unrecognized income in the plan or IRA. 11 Unfortunately, lifetime transfer planning is thwarted because
federal law prohibits the lifetime transfer of interests in qualified retirement plans, and state law usually
prohibits the lifetime transfer of IRAs. 12 States have adopted prohibitions of transfers of IRAs in order to
protect them from claims of creditors of the IRA owner.
Previously, commentators have discussed planning that involves transferring interests in IRAs. They have
correctly noted that federal law restrictions on transferability of interests in qualified plans do not apply to

IRAs. 13 Unfortunately, as stated above, state law prohibiting transfers of IRAs prevents such planning.
The Alaska Legislature's new provision allowing the voluntary lifetime transfer of IRA interests solves this
planning dilemma. 14 In addition, the acceleration of the inherent income in an IRA should be avoided if
the transfer is to an entity (including a grantor trust) that is disregarded for federal income tax purposes.
15 Consider the planning arrangements discussed below.
Example. An individual wishes to use her unused $5.25 million gift tax exemption but does not have
adequate assets to do so other than her IRA. Now she can transfer an Alaska IRA to an irrevocable trust
that is a grantor trust with respect to her for her loved ones without accelerating the income.
Alternatively, she could fund a grantor retained annuity trust (GRAT) with her Alaska IRA or make an
installment sale of it to a grantor trust, again without accelerating the inherent income in the IRA. Rev.
Rul. 85-13 16 provides that a transfer to a grantor trust is ignored for federal income tax purposes, and
the assets in the trust are treated for such purposes as though they are still owned by the grantor.
But since the IRA will still be an IRA for income tax purposes (as the transfer is ignored for such
purposes), how are the minimum required distribution (MDR) rules of Section 401(a)(9) applied when the
IRA is in a trust? 17 The trust (whether it is a revocable trust, 18 a GRAT, or a grantor trust to which it is
sold) should direct the trustee to take MDR distributions as "required" by Section 401(a)(9) . 19 As these
MRDs are taken by the trustee, they will be treated as though they have been received by the grantor,
and compliance with the section should be achieved. This is because the existence of the grantor trust is
ignored for purposes of federal income tax provisions of the Code, of which the MRD rules are a part.
Another question is how the trustee of a GRAT will make the annuity payments when the trust holds an
IRA. Rather than transferring the IRA to a GRAT, it should be transferred to a single-member LLC (which
also is an entity that is ignored for federal income tax purposes 20 ) and the LLC could be contributed to
the trust. The operating agreement of the LLC could provide that interests in it are freely transferable, so
the trustee could transfer a membership interest in the LLC to the grantor in satisfaction of the annuity
payments.
Community property state-type treatment. Next, consider the following planning for a couple where
one spouse has a large IRA, and together the spouses have substantial other assets. Couples in this
situation who live in a non-community property state often have difficulty adequately planning to fund fully
a "credit shelter" or "bypass" trust to use the unused estate tax exemption of the spouse dying first and to
take advantage of the surviving spouse achieving maximum income tax benefits with the IRA.
The situation would be more advantageous for a married couple in a community property state that uses
the "aggregate" approach of community property ownership and permits the estate of the first spouse to
die and the surviving spouse to "pick and choose" (i.e., allocate between themselves) which of their
community property assets will be used to fund the dispositions made by the spouse dying first. These
spouses have significant planning opportunities where an IRA or a qualified retirement plan is community
property.

Example. First, consider a couple who live in a community property state. They have never made any
taxable gifts, and own two community property assets (and nothing else). One asset consists of property
that will enjoy a "step up" in basis under Section 1014(a) ; the other asset is a traditional (non-Roth) IRA.
Each asset is worth $5.25 million, and the first spouse dies in 2013. The personal representative and
surviving spouse can "allocate" the assets that received the stepped-up basis to the spouse dying first so
those assets can be used to fund his or her credit shelter trust (equal to the $5.25 million unused estate
tax exemption). The IRA would be "allocated" to the survivor. 21 Having the surviving spouse be the
successor owner of the IRA usually is the best choice for its disposition and, on account of the inherent
income liability, is a poor choice for funding a credit shelter trust. 22
As indicated, this type of planning is not available for couples in non-community property states or in
those community property jurisdictions that do not use the aggregate approach and pick and choose
asset allocation when the first spouse dies. However, that can be achieved if the couple transfers their
assets, including the IRA, to an Alaska Community Property Trust which permits the aggregate approach
and a pick and choose allocation when the first spouse dies (as the default Alaska law does 23 ).
Regardless of which spouse is the owner of the IRA, it can be transferred to the Alaska Community
Property Trust without triggering income because the owner will continue to be treated as the IRA owner
even after the transfer. 24
Although at least some states will not permit lifetime transfers of IRAs (regardless of whether income
would be generated by the transfer), this now can be done under Alaska law. Hence, a couple desiring
such a beneficial result would transfer the IRAs (or other qualified retirement interests, if permitted) to one
or more Alaska IRAs and then transfer these to their Alaska Community Property Trust.

Stronger asset protection for trust beneficiaries
Asset protection is often one of the central concerns of clients when accomplishing their estate planning.
This concern extends not only to protecting assets during the clients' lifetimes but also to providing asset
protection for their family members. Many states have not adequately provided statutes supporting such
asset protection, thus failing to satisfactorily address these questions:
•

What type of protection is provided against a "super-creditor," such as the U.S. government
pursuing a tax lien?

•

Can a creditor compel a trustee to make a distribution to the beneficiary?

•

May a trustee pay expenses of a beneficiary rather than distributing assets directly to a
beneficiary?

•

Can a creditor obtain a court order that would attach or garnish assets or prevent a trustee from
making such distributions for the benefit of a beneficiary?

•

Would a trustee be held liable for making a distribution for the benefit of a beneficiary?

As is discussed below, Alaska's new legislation answers all of these questions.

The U.S. government, as indicated above, is typically viewed as a super creditor. Thus, where a
beneficiary of a trust is indebted to the IRS, the trust's assets may be reachable even though they might
be immune from other creditors.
Example. A trust instrument mandates that income be paid to the beneficiary. If, under state law, the
interest is subject to spendthrift protection, either because of a state statute or a provision in the
instrument, 25 the beneficiary's creditors, as a general matter, cannot reach the assets while they are
held in trust 26 -with narrow exceptions for creditors entitled to receive alimony or child support. 27 The
IRS, in contrast, is not precluded by the spendthrift doctrine from reaching the trust's assets. The
spendthrift doctrine, largely a state law creature, yields to federal law as a matter of preemption,
permitting the IRS to access the trust's assets irrespective of state law. 28
Expectancy vs. property interest. In the case of a discretionary trust, in contrast, the IRS' access to
trust assets is more limited. The IRS cannot reach the assets if the beneficiary's interest, as a matter of
state law, is a mere expectancy. If, on the other hand, the beneficiary has an enforceable property
interest under state law, the IRS is permitted to access the trust's assets. 29 This distinction is a rather
questionable one in that a beneficiary of a discretionary trust does in general have rights under state law.
Put differently, it is difficult to justify treating the beneficiary as having a mere expectancy in the context of
assessing the IRS' ability to reach the trust's assets if a beneficiary has a right to sue the trustee. 30
Nonetheless, the courts focus on this distinction in deciding whether the IRS can access the assets of a
discretionary trust. 31 In deciding whether the beneficiary has an enforceable property right, the courts
may examine not only state law but also the language used in the trust instrument. For example, the IRS
will emphasize that the instrument uses the word "shall" (i.e., "the trust shall distribute such amounts as
the trustee deems appropriate"); on the other hand, the beneficiary will emphasize the use of a word like
"may" (i.e., "the trustee may distribute ..."). 32 It is unfortunate that the outcome could be permitted to turn
on the selection of such words. For it seems unlikely that the lawyer drafting an instrument will appreciate
the significance of using one word or the other, much less that the settlor would be sensitive to such a
subtle difference in language.
Alaska's new legislation should strengthen the position of trust beneficiaries in seeking to resist federal
government access to trust assets. First, newly enacted Alaska Statute section 34.40.113 provides, in
subsection "b," that a beneficiary's interest in a discretionary trust is a mere expectancy, not a property
interest. It goes on to provide that, as a result, a creditor may not reach or otherwise attach the
beneficiary's interest. Thus, while under the law of other states the beneficiary might have to litigate this
question with the IRS (i.e., whether the beneficiary has an enforceable property right or a mere
expectancy under state law), this new provision should be conclusive in any such litigation. This provision
may prove to be helpful to beneficiaries not only in terms of dealing with the IRS as a creditor, but also
with creditors in general.
Trustee discretion. The section also provides, in subsection "h," that a distribution will be deemed to be
a matter of trustee discretion-which has the effect of making all of the provisions of the section

applicable-whether the instrument uses the word "shall" or the word "may" and without regard to whether
the instrument gives the trustee relaxed discretion (i.e., without regard to whether the instrument provides
that the trustee shall have sole discretion, absolute discretion, uncontrolled discretion, or discretion of a
similar nature). Thus, in drafting an instrument under Alaska law, one need not be concerned about the
impact of using such common language on the property-right-versus-expectancy issue. Like subsection
"b," this subsection may also prove to be helpful to beneficiaries when dealing with creditors in general,
not just the IRS.
Subsections "c," "d," "e," and "f" provide additional creditor protection to beneficiaries. Subsection "c"
provides that a creditor may not interfere with the trustee's exercise of discretion or seek to compel the
trustee to make a distribution to the creditor or to the beneficiary. Subsection "d" provides that if, under
the instrument, the trustee may make a discretionary distribution of income or principal to a beneficiary,
the trustee may instead apply the income/principal for the benefit of the beneficiary. So, for example, the
trustee could make a distribution to the beneficiary's landlord in discharge of the beneficiary's rent
obligation.
Subsection "e" provides that a creditor may not seek to interfere with the trustee's decision to make such
an application of principal/income. Subsection "f" concomitantly provides that the creditor may not obtain
a court order that would attach trust assets or otherwise prevent the trustee from making such an
application. And subsection "d" provides that the trustee may not be held liable by the creditor for making
an application on behalf of the beneficiary. Absent these provisions, creditors might well argue that the
trustee does not have authority to apply income/principal in this fashion or that the trustee becomes liable
to the creditor in connection with such an application. 33 As in the case of subsections "b" and "h," these
provisions could be helpful to the beneficiary as against creditors in general, not just the IRS. 34
In summary, Alaska may now have the strongest asset protection for a beneficiary's interest.
"Super-creditors" may have a difficult time reaching assets in an Alaska trust. All creditors will not be able
to force a trustee to make discretionary distributions directly to a beneficiary. A trustee may make
discretionary distributions for the benefit of a beneficiary by paying expenses directly rather than
distributing the funds to the beneficiary. A creditor may not obtain a court order that would prevent such
distributions on behalf of a beneficiary.

Asset protection for retirement plan beneficiary
An employee's interest in a qualified retirement plan is protected from creditors of the employee by
ERISA. 35 Many states have enacted a similar protection from creditors and have extended it to an
interest in an IRA. 36
However, what happens to asset protection when the employee dies and leaves his or her retirement plan
or IRA interest to a beneficiary? Similarly, what happens if the owner of an IRA transfers the owner's
interest to, for example, a grantor trust for a beneficiary? 37 Is the beneficiary's interest in the retirement

plan or IRA protected from the beneficiary's creditors prior to any distributions or withdrawals?
If a creditor asserts the creditor's claim against a beneficiary in a federal bankruptcy proceeding, the
majority of the bankruptcy court cases have held that the Bankruptcy Code protects the beneficiary's
interest. 38 What is the result if the creditor decides to pursue in state court the creditor's claim against
the beneficiary's IRA interest?
The Alaska Legislature decided to provide protection for the beneficiary's interest. Amendments to Alaska
Statute 09.38.017 provide very broad protection for an interest in a retirement plan, IRA, and money or
other assets payable to a beneficiary from such an interest or account. 39 "Beneficiary" is broadly defined
to include a person, trust, or trustee who has, before or after the death of a participant or owner, a direct
or indirect interest in a retirement plan or IRA (traditional or Roth). 40
This protection from creditor claims for a beneficiary who succeeds to interests in an Alaska IRA (or Roth
IRA) by reason of the death of the owner should apply even if neither the owner nor the successor
beneficiary resided or resides in Alaska. This is a conflict of laws issue. Which state's law applies-Alaska's
or the domiciliary state of the owner or beneficiary? The three courts that have considered this issue with
respect to creditor rights in a self-settled trust have relied on the test provided by section 270 of the
Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws. 41 This section provides that the law designated by the settlor
applies as long as it does not violate a strong public policy of the state with which, as to the matter at
issue, the trust has its most significant relationship.
Assuming, for the sake of discussion, that the beneficiary's state of residence has the most significant
relationship to the IRA, it appears that no state has a strong public policy against such asset protection.
This is because all states provide protection from creditor claims of an owner of an IRA (although in a few
states the protection is limited to a dollar amount or other limitation 42 ). Hence, it does not seem that
there is a viable argument that there is a strong public policy against IRA protection for an owner or
beneficiary in that person's state of residence. 43
Alaska follows Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, South Dakota, and Texas, which already have such
statutes, 44 and joins Missouri, Ohio, and North Carolina which in 2013 enacted similar beneficiary
creditor protection. 45

Alaska's new decanting statute
"Decanting" refers to the ability of a trustee who is authorized to invade the principal of an irrevocable
trust essentially to change the terms of the trust ("invaded trust") by creating a new trust ("appointed
trust") by paying all or a portion of the trust to that new trust or making the payment to any other trust for
one, more, or all of the beneficiaries of the invaded trust without a court order or the settlor's or
beneficiary's consent. Decanting is a useful estate planning tool and can be used for a variety of reasons,
including to:

•

Modify the terms of the trust.

•

Respond to beneficiary change of circumstances.

•

Protect assets for needs-based assistance planning. 46

•

Extend the term of a trust.

•

Address federal and state tax planning.

•

Correct errors in trust drafting. 47

In 1998, Alaska became the second state to adopt a decanting statute. 48 Since that time 20 states have
adopted decanting statutes. The various state statutes differ in what changes can be made to a trust by
decanting, and what power a trustee must have in order to use the decanting authority.
Use of Alaska law. Alaska is one of the few states whose decanting statute is applicable not only to a
trust governed by the laws of Alaska, including a trust whose governing law has been changed to the
laws of Alaska, but also to a trust that has an individual trustee domiciled in Alaska or a trust company
with an office in Alaska, provided that the majority of the trustees select Alaska as the location for the
primary administration of the trust. 49 This allows trustees of trusts domiciled in other states to use
Alaska's flexible decanting statute without changing the trust's governing law simply by appointing an
Alaska trustee (or co-trustees) and having the trustees agree that Alaska will be the primary place of the
trust's administration.
As initially enacted, the Alaska statute authorized a trustee with unlimited discretion to appoint all the
assets to a new trust. In 2006, the statute was amended to expand the decanting authority to a trustee
whose discretion was limited by a standard, such as an ascertainable standard. The Alaska Legislature
has now significantly revised the decanting statute, providing for bifurcated authority based on the
trustee's discretion, expressly authorizing a trustee to grant a beneficiary a power of appointment, extend
the term of the trust, and authorizing a trustee to decant to an appointed trust to protect public assistance
benefits.
The recently adopted Alaska statute is similar to the New York Statute adopted in 2011. 50 The statute
creates two tiers of decanting power:
(1) Decanting pursuant to unlimited discretion.
(2) Decanting pursuant to discretion that is limited under an ascertainable standard. 51
The revised Alaska statute expressly allows a trustee to decant assets from one trust to a new trust that
complies with Alaska law to protect needs-based assistance, even though the second trust removes
mandatory distribution standards, expands the term of the trust, or eliminates some of the beneficiaries.
52
Although the new New York and new Alaska statutes are quite similar in many ways, differences are
worth noting. For example, under the New York law, a trustee with unlimited discretion to invade may
grant a beneficiary a power of appointment under the appointed trust but the permissible appointees may
exclude only one or more of the beneficiaries; the settlor; the settlor's spouse; or any of the estates,

creditors, or creditors of the estates of such persons, and cannot expand the class of potential
appointees. 53 In Alaska, no such broad power of appointment need be contained in the appointed trust;
rather, the class of potential appointees can be expanded to include new beneficiaries, provided the
trustee had unlimited discretion to invade principal in the invaded trust. 54
Trustee discretion. Another potentially important difference relates to the trustee's power to make
distributions if the term of the trust is extended and the invaded trust does not grant the trustee unlimited
discretion to invade but only pursuant to a standard. Under New York law, the limited standard to make
payments to the beneficiary (or beneficiaries) must be the same under the appointed trust as it was in the
invaded trust. However, under the new Alaska statute, the trustee of the appointed trust can hold
unlimited discretion to distribute during the extended period.
Under the revised Alaska statute, a trustee with unlimited discretion to invade principal of a trust may
appoint all or part of the trust principal to a new trust created by either the settlor of the invaded trust,
someone else, or the trustees of the invaded trust. The new trust must be for the benefit of one or all of
the current beneficiaries of the invaded trust, and the trustee is granted the express power to exclude a
current beneficiary from the appointed trust. The trustee may not add beneficiaries in the appointed trust,
but may grant a discretionary power of appointment, including a presently exercisable power of
appointment, in the appointed trust to one or more of the current beneficiaries of the invaded trust.
The granted power of appointment may expand the class of permissible appointees beyond beneficiaries
of the invaded trust. For example, a trustee could grant a current beneficiary of the invaded trust a
testamentary power of appointment that is more expansive then the power of appointment in the invaded
trust, including one that is presently exercisable so that the beneficiary granted the power could direct
distributions to anyone in the class of appointees described in the power granted. 55 Because the
permissible appointees are not considered beneficiaries of the appointed trust, the addition of these
possible recipients of the trust does not violate the provision prohibiting the addition of new beneficiaries
in the appointed trust.
A trustee whose authority to distribute principal of the invaded trust that is limited by an ascertainable
standard (within the meaning of Reg. 25.2514-1(c)(2) ) is more restricted in the changes that can be
made in the appointed trust. A trustee without unlimited discretion cannot appoint trust principal to an
appointed trust unless the current and remainder beneficiaries of the appointed trust are the same, the
beneficiaries receive the same share in the appointed trust, and the standard for invading income or
principal remains the same. A trustee without unlimited discretion may grant a power of appointment to a
current beneficiary but only if the beneficiary had a power of appointment in the invaded trust and the
class of permissible appointees are the same as in the invaded trust.
A trustee without unlimited discretion may extend the term of the trust and may grant an additional trustee
unlimited discretion during the term of the extended trust. However, the additional trustee's unlimited
discretion does not apply to decanting authority which remains subject to the limitations of Alaska Statute
13.36.157(d) through (h). 56

The statute imposes limitations on a trustee's ability to reduce or eliminate a current mandatory
distribution of income or principal, a mandatory annuity or unitrust interest, a right to withdraw from the
trust provided that the mandatory right has come into effect. 57 A trustee, however, can eliminate or
reduce a mandatory right during the extended term of the trust. 58 For example, if a trust were to
terminate when the beneficiary reaches age 30 and then be distributed to him or her outright, a trustee
can eliminate the mandatory right in the extended term of the trust provided the assets are decanted to
the appointed trust before the beneficiary attains age 30.
Special needs planning. Most important to special needs planning, the revised Alaska statute provides
the planner with a non-judicial means of modifying the terms of a trust to comply with the applicable
needs-based program standard; this allows a beneficiary to benefit from the trust and retain his or her
needs-based public assistance. 59 A trustee with or without unlimited discretion may decant to a trust
with a revised standard for invading income or principal and may remove mandatory income or principal
distributions to protect the beneficiary's needs-based public assistance. 60 The Alaska statute expressly
authorizes decanting to a special needs trust, a pooled trust, or a third-party trust. 61
The revised Alaska statute also:
•

Requires that a trustee notify, in writing, beneficiaries of the decision to decant to an appointed
trust.

•

Expressly provides that a trustee has a fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries when exercising the
decanting power.

•

Imposes limitations on a trustee's power to decant a trust to protect tax benefits the invaded
trust has, even if the trustee's discretion is unlimited. 62

Required notice. A trustee may exercise the power to appoint to an appointed trust by a written
instrument that is signed, dated, and acknowledged by the trustee. The exercise of the power is effective
30 days after notice of the exercise is provided to the settlor, if living, of the invaded trust, a person having
the right, under the terms of the invaded trust, to remove or replace the trustee, and to a qualified
beneficiary or a person who may represent and bind a qualified beneficiary 63 under Alaska's virtual
representation statute. 64 The statute, however, allows a settlor to limit who is to receive notice if the
settlor has elected to limit trust notices only to beneficiaries who are entitled to mandatory distributions.
65
A beneficiary may object within 30 days of receiving notice. A beneficiary's objection does not prevent a
trustee from proceeding with the intended decanting of trust assets to the appointed trust, but a trustee
may initiate a court proceeding to obtain a court order approving the proposed decanting. A beneficiary
who did not object within the 30-day period may still object to a decanting until the expiration of the
limitation period applicable to a report disclosing the decanting. 66 Thus, while a trustee may proceed
with a decanting after providing notice, a risk remains that a beneficiary could object and file a court
proceeding to undo the decanting.

In exercising its decanting authority, a trustee is bound by its fiduciary duty to exercise the decanting
power in the best interest of one or more proper objects of the exercise of the power and is required to
consider the tax consequences of the proposed distribution. 67 The statute limits a trustee's decanting
authority if there is substantial evidence of a contrary intent of the settlor and the beneficiary objecting to
the decanting establishes that the settlor would not have authorized the decanting in light of the
circumstances existing at the time a trustee exercises the power.
When assessing the settlor's probable intent, the provisions of the invaded trust cannot alone be reviewed
as substantial evidence of a contrary intent of the settlor. The revised Alaska statute shifts to the objecting
beneficiary the burden of establishing that the settlor would not have approved of the proposed change in
the appointed trust.

Conclusion
The changes made by the Alaska Legislature this year provide expanded opportunities for estate and
income tax planning for many Americans regardless of where they live. The ability to transfer interests in
Alaska IRAs, without sacrificing creditor protection, presents a broad new form of lifetime estate planning
for retirement plan assets. The expanded protection from creditor claims for third-party-created trusts
(including super-creditors such as the IRS) and inherited IRAs suggest that Alaska be used as the place
to create them. The enactment of Alaska's new decanting statute and the ability to have it apply
regardless of the law that governs the validity, construction, and effect of a trust presents expanded
opportunities to "revise" preexisting trusts to achieve better results than would be available under the
trust's current terms.
Part 2 of this article, which will appear in a future issue of Estate Planning, will describe Alaska's
expanded authority for directed trustees and advisors, clarification of virtual representation, charging
order improvements for limited partnerships and limited liability companies, additional protection for
trustees of life insurance trusts, updating of Alaska's Uniform Principal and Income Act, trusts which avoid
state income tax, extended terms for UTMA accounts, improvements to Alaska's optional community
property system, and other provisions.
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